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THE "NECESSITY DEFENSE" AND THE
EMERGING ARBITRAL CONFLICT IN ITS
APPLICATION TO THE U.S.-ARGENTINA
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
Sarah F. Hill*
I. A GLIMPSE AT THE ARGENTINEAN ECONOMIC CRISIS
T the turn of the twenty-first century, while the Internet boom
was generating incredible wealth in developed countries, Argen-
tina experienced one of the worst economic and fiscal crises in
its history. Between 2001 and 2002, output fell 20 percent over three
years, inflation reignited, the government defaulted on its debt, the bank-
ing system was largely paralyzed, and the Argentine peso reached lows of
3.90 pesos per U.S. dollar.' In the context of other regional economic
troubles, such as the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, the Brazilian devaluation
in early 1999 and the steady appreciation of the dollar from 1998 to 2001,
the overvaluation of the Argentine peso led to a structural crisis. 2
Although there are recurring themes in the analyses of the events lead-
ing up to the crisis, blame cannot be assigned to any one individual or
entity. The government of Argentina is ultimately responsible for its own
fiscal policies, including, among others, the privatization of public utili-
ties. In retrospect, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded
that "the crisis .... was the result of economic forces that were difficult to
reverse in the context of Argentina's existing vulnerabilities," including
unmanageable public debt, the fixed currency board, and structural weak-
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in the early drafting stages of this article. Ms. Hill received her LL.M. (Interna-
tional Law) '07, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law; her J.D.
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1. Christina Daseking, Atish Ghosh, Timothy Lane, & Alun Thomas, Lessons from
the Crisis in Argentina 1 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 236, 2004)
[hereinafter IMF Lessons]. This publication also provides an in-depth analysis of
the events leading up to the crisis, the crisis itself and possible causes from the
Fund's viewpoint.
2. Jose Antonio Ocampo, The Mistaken Assumptions of the IMF, in THE CRISIS THAT
WAS NOT PREVENTED: LESSONS FOR ARGENTINA, THE IMF AND GLOBALIZATION
22 (Jan Joost Teunissen & Age Akkerman eds., Hague, Netherlands, Forum on
Debt and Development (FONDAD) 2003) [hereinafter Ocampo].
547
548 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
nesses that had built up during the 1990s. 3 By 2001, the IMF concluded
almost no strategy would have succeeded absent sovereign debt restruc-
turing of Argentina's public debt burden.4
The IMF is not blameless either, having made mistakes both before
and during the crisis. Although it expressed reservations at various times,
the IMF backed Argentina throughout the 1990s, and in 1998, the IMF
went so far as to say that Argentina's economic policy was 'the best in the
world,' despite its deep depression.5 During the crisis, the IMF delayed
its support, heightening foreign investors' perception of risk.6
The international financial community also shares some of the blame.
The favorable financial expectations promoted by institutions like the
IMF created a tremendous flow of foreign capital into Argentina; its sub-
sequent flight was one of the biggest contributing factors to the crisis. 7
The United States was particularly indifferent to the crisis. 8 The adminis-
tration of President George W. Bush imposed high tariffs on Argentine
exports and refused to adjust the tariffs during the crisis yet at the same
time provided tremendous support to the government of Turkey, which
was in a similar crisis but was strategically more important for the United
States' own economic and political interests.9
The crisis broke with the flight of private investment, which fell by
more than
$3.6 billion in the last two days of November 2001.10 On January 3,
2002, President Eduardo Duhalde, the fifth president in three weeks, con-
firmed a moratorium on Argentina's debts and announced he would ne-
gotiate with private creditors." Three days later, the government
enacted the Public Emergency and Exchange Regime Reform Act (Re-
form Act), declaring a state of public emergency and delegating social,
economic, administrative, and financial and exchange powers to the Ex-
ecutive.12 The Reform Act provided for the renegotiation of government
3. POLIcY DEV. & REVIEW DEP'T, IMF, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA
68 (Timothy Geithner, ed. 2003).
4. Id.
5. 'In fact, at the annual IMF meeting in 1998, the Fund's Managing Director her-
alded Argentina's economic policy as "the best in the world."' Ocampo, supra
note 2, at 26.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 'The bluntest statement of official indifference came from [United States] Treasury
Secretary Paul H. O'Neill this summer and helped accelerate the loss of capital
and confidence here. "They've been off and on in trouble for 70 years or more,"
Mr. O'Neill said dismissively in an interview with the British magazine The Econo-
mist. "They don't have any export industry to speak of at all. And they like it that
way. Nobody forced them to be what they are."' Larry Rohter, A Fiscal Crisis,
Paid in Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001, at A16.
9. Id.
10. IMF Lessons, supra note 1, at 37.
11. Id. at 38.
12. Public Emergency and Exchange Regime Reform Act, Law No. 25561, Executive
Order No. 50/2002, Jan. 7, 2002, [nmero extraordinario] B.O. (Arg.) (declaring a
state of emergency until December 10, 2003).
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contracts and established a commission to monitor the actions taken by
the executive in accordance with the Act.13
The Reform Act resulted in a flood of requests for arbitration at the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. These requests were filed by
foreign corporations seeking to recover for breach of contract under their
respective country's bilateral investment treaty with Argentina. As of
December 8, 2006, there were thirty-four cases currently pending against
Argentina in ICSID. 14 Eight have been resolved. 15 Argentina invoked
the controversial defense of necessity in two cases brought by United
States corporations; one arbitral panel accepted the defense, and one did
not. This article analyzes the cases to determine which panel was correct
within the context of established customary law and state practice regard-
ing the necessity defense or necessity doctrine.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION DRAFT
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The only attempt to codify the doctrine of necessity is found in the
United Nations International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on
State Responsibility (Draft Articles).1 6 The Draft Articles are intended
to specify the principles of state responsibility but not the rules. 17 They
echo themes established in customary law, which are cited extensively in
the commentary and will be discussed at length in this article.
The Draft Articles prohibit the assertion of the necessity defense by a
state except to "safeguard an essential interest against a grave and immi-
nent peril," and only if the action does not "seriously impair an essential
interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of
the international community. 1 8 Furthermore, they completely prohibit
the invocation of the doctrine if the obligation in question "excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity" or if the state itself "contributed to the
13. Pablo Hourbeigt, The Public Emergency Act No. 25.561 and its Impact on the Ar-
gentina's Power Sector, March 8, 2002, http://www.lexuniversal.com/en/articles/913.
14. ICSID List of Pending Cases, World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
pending.htm.
15. ICSID List of Concluded Cases, World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/conclude.htm.
16. See International Law Commission [ILC], Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, at 43, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Dec. 12, 2001), [hereinafter Draft
Articles].
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id. at 49. Article 25:
(1) Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obliga-
tion of that State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safe-
guard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b)
Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States to-
wards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a
whole.
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situation of necessity." 19
James Crawford, the author of the commentary to the Draft Articles,
notes that unlike other defenses in international law, necessity is excep-
tional because it does not depend on the prior conduct of the injured
state, but it arises in the case of two conflicting interests: the obligation of
the state under the law and the interests giving rise to the necessity.20
The determination as to whether the interests are essential is necessarily
dependent upon the relative concerns of and threats to the state, its peo-
ple, and the international community. 21 But, whatever the interest, it
must also be threatened by a "grave and imminent peril" before necessity
may be raised in defense of the state's action to protect it.22
In any event, the defense is completely excluded if other lawful means
are available to preserve the interest, even if they are more costly or less
convenient.23 Furthermore, the conduct of the state may not "seriously
impair an essential interest" of any other state concerned or the interna-
tional community. 24 All of these elements must be satisfied before neces-
sity can preclude the wrongfulness of the state action in breach.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES
Because of the varying treatment of the doctrine of necessity in cus-
tomary international law, some have questioned whether the Draft Arti-
cles accurately reflect the development of the doctrine. 25 Critics suggest
that the drafters "stitched together" arbitral awards and state practice to
create the illusion of a broader acceptance of the doctrine in a way that is
"dated, ambiguous, or otherwise not particularly compelling. '26 The very
language of article 25 is attacked as being "deliberately vague," "open-
ended," and overly dependent on the particular circumstances of each
individual case.27
But this critique does not take into account the development of cus-
tomary law that has elevated the doctrine of necessity to a long-standing
value of international political and legal discourse. Nor does it appreciate
the fact that its inherent nature as dependent on circumstance does not
preclude a certain degree of analytical consistency-as evidenced in the
development of the doctrine to date.
19. Id. at 49. Article 25: "(2) In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if: a) The international obligation in question
excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) The State has contributed to
the situation of necessity."
20. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 16, at 195, 2.
21. Id. at 202, I. 15.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 203, 17.
25. Symposium, The ILC's State Responsibility Articles, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 773,
PINCITE (2002).
26. Id. at 788.
27. Id. at 789.
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IV. EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY LAW ESTABLISHING
THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
The earliest notions of necessity are rooted in military self-defense and
the idea that legitimate conflicting activities cause inevitable harm.2 8 In
432 B.C., representatives from the Greek city-state of Sparta convened a
meeting of the Peloponnesian League to ask their allies whether they
should go to war over Athenian violations of the Thirty Years' Peace
Treaty, whereupon the Corinthians urged immediate action, stating, "We
have arrived at the moment of necessity." 2 9
References to necessity can be found in domestic legal traditions, such
as the Kinkyu-hinan in Japan, Notstand in Germany, and itat de n~cessit6
in France. 30 Indeed, the concept of necessity is "'so deeply rooted in the
consciousness of the members of the international community" that
Judge Robert Ago of the International Court of Justice once [said] that if
it was "driven out the door it would return through the window."' 3
As it has evolved through customary international law, necessity has
been used to justify various policies both to intervene when it was expedi-
ent and to abstain when it was not.32 Thus, a dual role has evolved: the
doctrine is used not only as a shield from liability for actions taken by the
state to avert a morally repugnant humanitarian disaster, but also as a
sword, justifying the attack of a perceived threat under the banner of a
moral imperative. By examining the various applications of necessity in
international customary law to date, patterns emerge that are helpful in
determining whether Argentina has rightfully asserted the defense.
A. MILITARY NECESSITY
In the Anglo-Portuguese dispute of 1832, property owned by British
subjects was appropriated by the Portuguese in violation of treaty obliga-
tions in order to provide for the subsistence of troops engaged in quelling
internal disturbances. 33 The parties agreed in a rare moment of diplo-
matic unity, the British conceding that the treaty could not be
28. "Like parallel activities, legitimate conflicting activities cause inevitable harm.
These are the rights of self-defence. Thus, there may be a defence either of a legiti-
mate group (national, occupational, social or religious), or of an individual. Self-
defence, legal proceedings or necessity are ... examples of this." International
Law Commission, Second Report on State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
at 6, 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.3 (Apr. 1, 1999) (prepared by James Craw-
ford) (emphasis in the original).
29. Gregory A. Raymond, Necessity in Foreign Policy, 113 POL. Sci. Q. 673, 673 (1998-
1999) [hereinafter Raymond] (citing THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNE-
SIAN WAR 30 (Paul Woodruff, ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1993).
30. Id. at 675.
31. Id. at 684 (quoting from Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility,
[1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 51, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7).
32. Id. at 675.
33. James Crawford, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 196, 4 (2002)
[hereinafter ILC COMMENT].
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of so stubborn and unbending a nature, as to be incapable of modifi-
cation under any circumstances whatever, or that their stipulations
ought to be so strictly adhered to, as to deprive the Government of
Portugal of the right of using those means, which may be absolutely
and indispensably necessary to the safety, and even to the very exis-
tence of the State.34
State practice thus embraced the acknowledgment of the doctrine of
necessity as inherent.
Necessity was again invoked in state practice in the "Caroline" incident
of 1837, during which British armed forces attacked and destroyed a ship
owned by American citizens that was carrying recruits and military
materials to Canada in violation of a treaty.35 In the end, both Govern-
ments agreed that "a strong overpowering necessity may arise when this
great principle may and must be suspended. '36 "It must be so," added
Lord Ashburton, the British Government's envoy to Washington, "for
the shortest possible period during the continuance of an admitted over-
ruling necessity, and strictly confined within the narrowest limits imposed
by that necessity."'37 Emerging out of military necessity, the doctrine has
since been developed in other areas of international law where imminent
harm requires the suspension of legal obligation.
B. HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY
The doctrine's dual application is most clearly illustrated in its recent
applications to humanitarian crises. On one hand, it has been used as a
shield to escape the harmful consequences of strict adherence to the law,
such as the justification of NATO's emergency interference in Kosovo in
the late 1990s without the pre-approval of the United Nations Security
Council.38 On the other hand, necessity has also been used as a sword to
enact protectionist measures and avoid a moral responsibility. For exam-
ple, in cases where disturbances lead to a mass displacement of individu-
als to neighboring countries, the concept of necessity has been used to
justify a state's border closure to prevent a large-scale influx of asylees. 39
34. Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 32nd Sess., [1980] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7 [hereinafter Eighth Report
Addendum] (citing 2 A.D. McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 231 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1956)) (prepared by Robert Ago) (emphasis in original).
35. Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 34 at p. 40, 57, fn. 117.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Ian Johnstone, The Plea of "Necessity" in International Legal Discourse: Humani-
tarian Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 360-
366 (2005) [hereinafter Johnstone].
39. See Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful
Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, (2000) [hereinafter Boed] describing
the 1995 exodus of Rwandan refugees and local Burundis to the border of
Tanzania and Tanzania's invocation of the doctrine of necessity to subsequently
close of its borders to prevent the migration of the refugees. Necessity has also
been used as a sword in cases justifying the use of torture to secure information
under the guise of national security.
THE "NECESSITY DEFENSE"
One of the earliest assertions of necessity involved a humanitarian
theme. The Neptune Case, considered by an arbitral panel convened
under the Jay Treaty in 1797, resulted from the seizure by the British
Army of an American vessel on its way to France to sell the food prod-
ucts on board.40 Although the army paid for the products that it took
from the American vessel plus a 10 percent profit, the Americans argued
that they were entitled to the difference of the price they would have
received on the open market in France.41 The tribunal agreed, rejecting
the British Government's claim that the food was seized out of necessity
due to a short supply in their country and stating that although the right
to assert a necessity existed in international law, the British had not ex-
hausted all other means of self-preservation as required by the doctrine.42
C. ENVIRONMENTAL NECESSITY
The doctrine of necessity has also been accepted in environmental
cases, the earliest of these being the Russian Fur Seals Case of 1893.4 3
The Russian Government, fearing the danger of the extermination of a
fur seal population by unrestricted hunting, issued a decree prohibiting
sealing in an area of the high seas until a long-term solution could be
reached.44 The "essential interest" to be safeguarded was the natural re-
source, and the "grave and imminent peril" was the lack of jurisdiction of
any state or treaty to regulate it.45
In Torrey Canyon, another early environmental necessity case, a ship
became grounded on submerged rocks outside British territorial waters,
spilling large amounts of oil that threatened the English coastline. 46 To
remedy the situation, the British government destroyed the ship and
burned the remaining oil.47 Although there was no international protest,
the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (High Seas Convention) was adopted
shortly thereafter, and its language foreshadowed the terminology of the
Draft Articles.48
The High Seas Convention provides that member states can take mea-
sures in international waters "as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or
eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests
40. Id. at 8 (citing The Neptune, reprinted in IV International Adjudications: Modern
Series 372 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1931) (decided in 1797)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 9, n.36 (citing the opinion of arbitration panelist Mr. Trumball, "The neces-
sity which can be admitted to supersede all laws and to dissolve the distinctions of
property and right must be absolute and irresistible, and we cannot, until all other
means of self-preservation shall have been exhausted, justify by the plea of neces-
sity the seizure and application to our own use of that which belongs to others.")
43. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 16,, at 197, T 6.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil" due to a maritime
casualty that "may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful
consequences. ' 49 Also, the treaty requires that no matter what type of
action is taken, it "shall not unnecessarily interfere with the rights and
interests of the flag State, third States and of any persons, physical or
corporate. 50 Themes of necessity are also included in the provisions gov-
erning the proportionality of the emergency measures taken.5 1 In sum,
the High Seas Convention codified the necessity defense as it pertains to
international waters, identified its application in the corporate context,
and represents a pre-Draft Articles international consensus regarding the
elements of the necessity defense.
Despite these examples of apparent international recognition of the
doctrine of necessity, in 1990 the arbitral panel in the Rainbow Warrior
Case expressed doubt as to the very existence of the doctrine in interna-
tional law.52 Yet within the next decade, the International Court wholly
embraced the doctrine in their decision in the well-known Gabcikovo-
Nagymoros Project Case involving a dispute over the building of a dam
on the River Danube. 53 Although the Court did not allow the assertion
of necessity under the circumstances of the case, its discussion of the doc-
trine cemented the establishment of the necessity defense in modern ju-
risprudence as customary international law. 54
For the most part, the Court in Gabcikovo-Nagymoros accepted the
elements of necessity as set forth in the Draft Articles.55 The Court had
no difficulty in acknowledging that Hungary's environmental concerns
were "essential" but found that they had not sufficiently established that
the peril was "imminent". 56 Hungary's proofs failed even though the
Court adopted a more expansive view of imminency than the Draft Arti-
cles. In expanding the concept of imminency, the Court indicated that
the peril need not be immediate but may be a future harm, which may be
imminent as soon as it is established.57 Evidently, the arbitral panel's
49. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties art. 1(1), Nov. 29, 1969, 970 U.N.T.S. 211, 1975 WL 28052
(emphasis added).
50. Id. art. V, 1$ (1) & (2).
51. Id. art. V, (3).
In considering whether the measures are proportionate to the damage,
account shall be taken of: (a) the extent and probability of imminent
damage if those measures are not taken; and (b) the likelihood of those
measures being effective; and (c) the extent of the damage which may be
caused by such measures.
52. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 16,, at 199, 1 10 (citing Rainbow Warrior Affair
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 215, 217, 254 (Apr. 30, 1990))..
53. Id. at 199, . 11; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung v. Slovk.), 1997
I.C.J. 2.
54. Id.
55. Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 50-52 (Sept. 25).
56. Id. [ 54-57.
57. Id. 54.
That does not exclude, in the view of the Court, that a "peril" appearing
in the long term might be held to be "imminent" as soon as it is estab-
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challenges to the necessity defense in Rainbow Warrior were unpersua-
sive, as the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Court fully embraced and even some-
what expanded the doctrine. 58
D. ECONOMIC NECESSITY
Although some would argue that the necessity defense is limited to the
context of military action, there is clear evidence that, in addition to the
above environmental scenarios, necessity has also been raised in the con-
text of foreign crises and investment. In the Russian Indemnity Case, the
Ottoman Government, to justify its delay in paying its debt to the Rus-
sian Government, relied on the fact that it had been in an extremely diffi-
cult financial situation.59 The arbitral panel analyzed the Russian claim
very restrictively, holding that necessity could only be invoked if compli-
ance with the international obligation at issue would be "self-
destructive. " 60
In the Societ6 Commerciale de Belgique Case, the Greek Government
owed money to a Belgian company under two arbitral awards but pled
the country's serious budgetary and monetary situation as a necessity that
precluded its obligation to pay.6 1 The Court implicitly accepted the prin-
ciple of necessity but declined to declare whether the Greek Government
was within its rights to assert the defense in that instance. 62
Other courts have denied a state from asserting a financial necessity
defense when alternative means to avoid the peril are available. 6 3 In the
Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Case, the Tribunal declined to comment
on the appropriateness of codifying the doctrine of necessity but noted
that the measures taken by the defendant Burundi did not appear to have
been the only way to safeguard its essential interest. 64 Most recently, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rejected a necessity defense
raised by Guinea in a case defending its right to seize a foreign vessel in
accordance with its customs laws for providing oil within Guinea's exclu-
sive economic zone. 65 The Tribunal held that alternative means were
lished, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril,
however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable.
58. For an additional example of necessity in the context of environmental issues, see
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4), wherein Ca-
nada enacted emergency legislation to put a stop to the exploitation of the stocks
by Spanish fishermen. The Court declined jurisdiction, and this opinion is there-
fore not included in this analysis.
59. The Government brought the claim as "force majeure" but it was more like a state
of necessity. DRAFr ARTICLES, supra note 16, at 197-198, $ 7.
60. Id.
61. DRAFr ARTICLES, supra note 16, at 198,T 8.
62. Id.
63. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 16, at 199, n.413.
64. Id. (citing Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company v. Republic of Burundi, 96
I.L.R. 279, 319 (Arbitral Trib. 1994)).
65. Andreas Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State of) Necessity, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 497-498 (2004).
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available to avoid the economic harm alleged.66
Necessity is likewise unavailable when the state itself contributes to the
economic crisis. In the Oscar Chinn Case, despite the fact that the issue
of necessity was never pled, the Permanent Court of International Justice
found that respondent Belgium had several options to choose from to
avoid financial crisis and that the final decision to create an illegal mo-
nopoly over the Congo River ultimately rested with the Belgian Govern-
ment.67 The Court remarked that the Belgian Government itself used a
number of policies to avoid the crisis, thereby demonstrating that a num-
ber of alternative means were available. 68
Similarly, in the French Company of Venezuela Railroads Case of 1905,
the French-Venezuelan Claims Commission decided a case regarding eco-
nomic losses incurred by the company when the Venezuelan revolutions
of the 1890s slowed its railroad construction. 69 The panel held Venezuela
liable for the acts of the revolutionary movement because the revolution
was successful, but it did not provide a reason for doing so.70
In a rare case involving the combination of both the military and eco-
nomic necessity doctrines, ICSID discussed the relative burdens to be ap-
plied. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka was the first case submitted
to ICSID arbitration based upon a consent provision in Sri Lanka-UK
Bilateral Investment Treaty [BIT]. 7 1 The claimant's main producing farm
was destroyed on January 28, 1987, during a military operation conducted
by the security forces of Sri Lanka against local rebels.72 The BIT be-
tween the United Kingdom and Sri Lanka required "adequate compensa-
tion for the destruction of the Claimant's property if the circumstances
were not justified by combat action or the necessities of the situation. '73
The Court charged Sri Lanka with the burden of providing convincing
proof of both.74
But the Tribunal noted that the restitution clause of the BIT appeared
66. Id.
67. "The question whether the Belgian Government was acting, as the saying is, under
the law of necessity is an issue of fact which would have had to be raised, if need
be, and proved by the Belgian Government." The Oscar Chinn Case (Gr. Brit. v.
Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 7 (May 1).
68. Id.
It may be observed, moreover, that there are certain undisputed facts
which appear inconsistent with a plea of necessity. To begin with, there
is the fact that, when the Belgian Government took the decision ... it
chose, from among several possible measures.., that which it regarded
as the most appropriate in the circumstances.
69. French Company of Venezuelan Railroads (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
9, 285 (Mixed CI. Comm'n 1905).
70. Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution
and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 265, 301
(2004).
71. Keith Highet et al., Bilateral Investment Treaties-Applicable Law-State Responsi-
bility-Compensation Standard, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 371, PINCITE (1992).
72. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka , 30 I.L.M. 577, 581 (1991).
73. Id. at 582, 1 7 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 605, 58.
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to grant most favored nation (MFN) status to investors suffering losses.75
The mere proof of losses sustained would be sufficient to require restitu-
tion without the need to determine whether the destruction was neces-
sary. 76 The Tribunal also found that the language of the BIT was so
general that the MFN clause should be interpreted to cover all losses,
including those incurred during a state of national emergency. 77 Claim-
ant was thus awarded damages to compensate for its loss, but not on the
basis of necessity.
V. CMS AND LG&E - THE ICSID ARBITRATION PANELS'
CONFLICTING ANALYSES
Two ICSID panels have reached different conclusions regarding the in-
terpretation of Argentina's plea of necessity in defense of alleged
breaches of article 11 of the BIT between the United States and Argen-
tina (the BIT or Treaty), which reads "This treaty shall not preclude the
application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of
public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the mainte-
nance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection
of its own essential security interests. '78
The relevant inquiry is the scope of the article, specifically what consti-
tutes an "essential security risk." Argentina seeks to evade liability for
breaching the BIT through this public order provision, claiming that the
breach was necessary to avoid economic crisis and contending that the
circumstances giving rise to the crisis as well as the consequences there-
from were "essential security risks" within the contemplation of the BIT.
A. CMS GAS TRANSMISSION CO.
The first case ever decided by the ICSID in the context of the Argen-
tinean economic crisis, CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic
(CMS Gas) was brought by a Michigan-based company (CMS) six
months prior to the peak of the crisis. 79 It alleged that the Government
of Argentina breached the BIT by suspending a tariff adjustment formula
for gas transportation. 80 After Argentina had privatized the gas industry,
75. Highet, supra note 71, at 373.
76. Id.
77. Asian Agric. Prods., 30 I.L.M. at 606-07.
Under these circumstances, it would be extremely difficult to determine
whether the destructions and losses were caused as an inevitable result of
the 'necessity of the situation.' . . . Article 4.(1) becomes the only part of
Article 4 providing remedy that could be available for the Claimant to
base his claims thereunder. For the applicability of Article 4.(1), the only
condition required is the presence of "losses suffered".
78. Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States of America and the Argen-
tine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of In-
vestments art. 11, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., 740 PLI/Lit 1245, 1261 (2006)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT].
79. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/8, 2005 WL 1201002 T 4.
80. Id.
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CMS bought over one quarter of the interest in one of the new gas com-
panies that was licensed to operate for the next thirty-five years.81
The licensing and offering agreements stated that the tariffs were to be
calculated in U.S. dollars, converted to pesos at the time of billing, and
adjusted every six months in accordance with U.S. inflation.82 However,
Argentina unilaterally changed the form of the tariffs, prompting CMS to
file with the ICSID for breach of the BIT.83 The claim was registered by
the ICSID on August 24, 2001.84
Argentina's arguments relied heavily upon customary international law
and the provisions of the Draft Articles. Citing the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Case and the French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case,
Argentina presented its arguments according to the definition of neces-
sity set forth by the Draft Articles, first by comparing the instances of
"grave and imminent peril" in those two cases to the circumstances sur-
rounding its own economic crisis. 85 Secondly, Argentina argued that the
State did not contribute to the creation of the state of necessity in a "sub-
stantive" way, but that the situation was prompted "for the most part by
exogenous factors."' 86 Additionally, they claimed that the measures
adopted "were the only measures capable of safeguarding the essential
economic interests affected."'8 7 Finally, Argentina argued that it did not
breach the essential interests of another state or of the international com-
munity as a whole by adopting these measures and that the foreign inves-
tors were not treated in a discriminatory manner.88
CMS initially argued that Argentina did not meet the burden of prov-
ing the necessity as set forth in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case.89 Severe
as the crisis may have been, it did not involve "grave" or "imminent"
peril, nor could Argentina definitively establish that they had not them-
selves contributed to the emergency; CMS took the position that most of
the causes underlying the crisis were endogenous to the State.90 Finally,
CMS countered that Argentina had not shown that the measures adopted
were the only means available to overcome the crisis.91
The Tribunal's analysis referenced heavily the customary international
law regarding necessity. Quoting the Draft Articles verbatim and citing
the Caroline, Russian Indemnity, Socigt Commerciale de Belgique, Torrey
Canyon and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros cases, the Tribunal held against Ar-
81. Id. 11-2; see also Barry Appleton, A Closer Look at CMS v. Argentina: The Im-
pact of ICSID's First Argentine Crisis Award, APPLETON'S NEWS 055, 2005 WL
1071211 (2005).
82. Appleton, supra note 81.
83. Id.
84. CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2005 WL 1201002 [ 7.
85. Id. $1 309-312.
86. Id. 91 312.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. 91 313.
90. Id. 91 314.
91. Id.
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gentina for a number of reasons.92 First, with respect to whether the se-
verity of the crisis itself warranted the defense of necessity, the Tribunal
noted competing viewpoints of leading economists on both sides and con-
cluded that although the crisis was severe, the circumstances could not
preclude wrongfulness as a matter of course. 93
Secondly, the Tribunal held that the measures adopted to prevent the
crisis were not the only means available.94 Furthermore, the most dam-
aging finding of all was the Tribunal's conclusion that the Argentinean
Government itself substantially contributed to the crisis, beginning with
its fiscal policies dating back to the 1980s.95
Notably, however, the Tribunal did agree that article 11 of the BIT
does include economic crises in the definition of "essential security inter-
est" and that such interests are not limited to physical threats to national
security or military invasions.96 Although the Tribunal ultimately found
that the economic crisis did not rise to the level of an essential security
interest, its determination that necessity is not limited to military action is
significant to the advancement of necessity as a defense in customary in-
ternational law.
Finally, the Tribunal examined whether article 11 was "self-judging",
that is, whether a state seeking to invoke the provision may itself deter-
mine whether a security interest is so essential as to trigger its protections
or if some sort of judicial review is required.97 The Tribunal concluded
that a state is free to determine its course of action, but once challenged,
the reviewing body is charged with the responsibility of determining
whether the state's claim of necessity was warranted by the
circumstances. 98
B. LG&E CAPITAL CORP.
The facts are almost identical in the case of LG&E Capital Corp. v.
Argentine Republic (LG&E), which also resulted from Argentina's uni-
lateral tariff adjustment in the newly-privatized gas industry. LG&E, a
Kentucky corporation, purchased interest in three gas distribution com-
panies-Centro, Cuyana, and GasBan-and brought a claim in ICSID for
breach of contract after the tariff adjustment.99 LG&E's claim was regis-
tered with the Tribunal on January 31, 2002, five months after the CMS
Gas case was registered, and several months after the economic crisis
92. Id. T$ 315-316.
93. Id. 320.
94. Id. 324.
95. Id. $T 328-329.
96. Id. T$ 359-361.
97. Id. [ 366.
98. Id. 373.
99. Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal Holds Argentina Liable for BIT Breaches, But Ac-
cepts Necessity Plea in Part, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.
iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn-oct5-2006.pdf.
2007]
560 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
climaxed.100
The Tribunal determined that the relevant arguments on the doctrine
of necessity and the scope of article 11 were: (1) whether the conditions
that existed in Argentina during the relevant period were such that the
state was entitled to invoke the protections included in article 11 of the
Treaty; and (2) whether the measures implemented by Argentina were
necessary to maintain public order or to protect its essential security in-
terests, albeit in violation of the Treaty. 10 1
Argentina argued that the tariff policy was adopted in order to over-
come the economic crisis, and if the policy resulted in a violation of the
rights guaranteed under the BIT, such measures were implemented under
a "state of necessity" under article 11 of the BIT and customary interna-
tional law, excusing them from liability during the crisis. 102 Argentina
further claimed that economic stability falls within a state's "essential se-
curity interests" and that during the crisis period, the health, safety and
security of the Argentine State were "imminently threatened." As such,
the laws passed to alter its financial arrangements were justified by
necessity. 103
LG&E rejected Argentina's contentions regarding the alleged state of
necessity, arguing-despite the previous ruling of CMS Gas to the con-
trary-that the "essential security interest" language of article 11 of the
BIT is not applicable in the case of an economic crisis -because the lan-
guage is intentionally narrow in scope and limited to physical security
threats in defense or military concerns.10 4 LG&E further argued that ele-
vating an economic crisis to the level of an essential security interest
would disregard the object and purpose of the Treaty, because it is in
times of economic uncertainty that the investors must be able to rely
upon the protections contained in the BIT.10 5
With respect to the necessity of the particular economic policies,
LG&E identified four measures that the Government implemented uni-
laterally under a claim of "necessity"-suspension and subsequent abol-
ishment of the Producer Price Index adjustment, freezing the gas-
distribution tariffs, and abandonment of the calculation of the tariffs in
dollars-and contended that in order to assert its necessity defense to
these acts, Argentina had to prove that these were the only means availa-
ble to avoid the crisis and protect the essential interests under article
11.106
Whereas the arbitral panel in CMS Gas approached the issue first with
a customary international law analysis, the LG&E panel began with a
100. LG&E Capital Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/
1, 2006 WL 2985837 1 1-2.
101. Id. 91 205.
102. Id. $1 201-202.
103. Id. 219.
104. Id. 203, 222.
105. Id. 91 222.
106. Id. 91 220.
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literal analysis of the language of the Treaty and then applied the custom-
ary international law regarding necessity to further interpret the provi-
sions in dispute as to scope and intent.1 07 The Tribunal cited a parade of
economic indicators, evidence of civil unrest, murder, and mass protests,
which reflected a situation of grave economic, political, and social crisis in
the country.'0 8 Then, in response to LG&E's argument that the "essen-
tial security interest" language of article 11 applied only to military ac-
tions, the Tribunal soundly rejected that notion, stating that the
conditions in Argentina at the height of the crisis called for "immediate,
decisive" action to restore order.10 9 Similarly, the Tribunal cited the ur-
gency with which the crisis legislation was passed as reflected in Argen-
tina's witness testimony, summarily rejecting the assertion that Argentina
had other means available to avoid the crisis.' 10
In addressing whether article 11 is self-judging, Argentina argued that
language of the Article suffered from "strategic ambiguity" on the part of
the United States, since it does not clearly define who should determine if
the measures to maintain public order or protect essential security inter-
ests are necessary."' Siding with LG&E on this issue, the Tribunal dis-
agreed, stating that the United States did not consider essential security
clauses as self-judging until after the Treaty was passed, therefore the BIT
provisions must be interpreted in conformity with the interpretation
given and agreed upon by both parties at the time of this signature.
112
On this sole point, both the CMS and LG&E panels agreed.
After concluding that a state of necessity existed under the BIT and
customary international law, the Tribunal ruled that from December 1,
2001 until April 26, 2003, Argentina was in a period of crisis during which
it was necessary to enact measures to maintain public order and protect
its essential security interests.1 13 The Tribunal chose these dates because
they coincided with the Government's announcement of the measure
freezing funds, which prohibited bank account owners from withdrawing
more than one thousand pesos monthly, and with the election of Presi-
dent Kirchner. 114
Once order was restored to the country, the Tribunal argued, the tariff
regime should have been reinstituted." 5 Therefore, Argentina is liable
107. See id. $ 226-266.
108. Id. $$ 231-237.
109. Id. at 238.
To conclude that such a severe economic crisis could not constitute an
essential security interest is to diminish the havoc that the economy can
wreak on the lives of an entire population and the ability of the Govern-
ment to lead. When a State's economic foundation is under siege, the
severity of the problem can equal that of any military invasion.
110. Id. $$ 240-41 (citing the witness testimony of Eduardo A. Ratti and Nouriel
Roubini).
111. Id. 209.
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for the damages resulting after April 23, 2003, the date order was re-
stored. 1 6 Citing evidence that the conditions as of December 2001 con-
stituted the "highest degree of public disorder" and "threatened
Argentina's essential security interests," the Tribunal discredited LG&Es
claim that the period was one of "economic problems" or "business cycle
fluctuation. '117
Finally, and perhaps most telling, the Tribunal placed the burden on
LG&E to prove that Argentina itself contributed to the state of neces-
sity.' 18 Finding that it did not so prove, the Tribunal concluded that the
efforts of Argentina's Government were focused on slowing down the
impact of the economic, social and political crisis, and did not contribute
significantly to the factors that caused it.119 This particular portion of the
Tribunal's analysis is the most troubling. The bulk of customary interna-
tional law regarding the defense of necessity as discussed at length herein
places the burden of proof not on the party seeking to enforce the treaty
or agreement but upon the state seeking protection from an alleged
breach thereof. As such, on this particular provision, it appears that the
Tribunal departed from established custom. It is unclear from the text of
the decision whether the Tribunal did so to avoid the morass of economic
evidence that the CMS tribunal sifted through or whether the Tribunal
had any other justification for such a departure.
Reaction to the LG&E decision has been mixed. Some categorize the
decision as political, bearing little precedential value on the issue of ne-
cessity. 120 But a recent article by an international arbitration practitioner
offers a much more ominous observation that the holding in the LG&E
Case is so inclusive that it might be said that the Tribunal's analysis
throws open the doors for abuse in times of economic hardship, rendering
BITs less effective on the whole. 121 Still others question whether unfa-
vorable ICSID awards such as CMS Gas will actually ever be enforced or
if the Argentinean Government will find that the awards are in conflict
116. Id.
117. Id. at 231, 235.
Extremely severe crises in the economic, political and social sectors
reached their apex and converged in December 2001, threatening total
collapse of the Government and the Argentine State. . . .Widespread
violent demonstrations and protests brought the economy to a halt, in-
cluding effectively shutting down transportation systems. Looting and
rioting followed in which tens of people were killed as the conditions in
the country approached anarchy.
118. Id. 256.
119. Id.
120. TODD WEILER, editor of investmentclaims.com and naftaclaims.com says: "My im-
pression is that the decision is a prudent, political one. I would not read too much
into it, at least with respect to the substantive necessity defence." Todd Weiler,
ICSID grants Argentina's Necessity Plea, GLOBAL ARB.REV., Nov. 3, 2006 http://
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/newsitem.cfm?item-id=3586.
121. David Foster, Necessity Knows No Law! LG&E v. Argentina, 9(6) INT'L ARB. L.
REV. 149, 149-155 (2006).
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with domestic law. 122 With a large number of cases still pending at the
ICSID, further development of the economic necessity defense is likely.
VI. A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION: NECESSITY AS A
JUSTIFICATION OR AN EXCUSE
In a recent article, Ian Johnstone analyzed whether necessity is prop-
erly utilized as a defense or if it is more useful in excusing failures of the
state or even in justifying unlawful behavior in the name of "national
security.' 2 3 When used to justify behavior, the state accepts responsibil-
ity but denies that its actions were bad; when used as an excuse, the state
admits that its actions were bad but either partially or completely rejects
responsibility. 1 24 In other words, justification concedes that the elements
of the offense are satisfied, but asserts that the act is not wrongful; excuse
concedes that the act is wrongful, but seeks to avoid fault. 12 5 The distinc-
tion is important because excuses can be claimed only by those in direct
peril, while justifications can also be claimed by third parties. 126 Justifica-
tions relate to whether the act is right or wrong, whereas excuses look to
the circumstances of the actor. And the availability of the excuse de-
pends on the actor's personal circumstances. 127
The language used in the Draft Articles establishing the defense as a
"ground for precluding wrongfulness" supports the idea that "necessity"
is a justification, not an excuse. 1 28 But CMS Gas appears to analyze it as
an excuse. In determining whether Argentina was in "grave and immi-
nent" peril sufficient to justify necessity, the Tribunal found that although
the situation was difficult enough to justify the government's taking pre-
ventative actions, it did not preclude the wrongfulness of those actions. 129
CMS Gas viewed the assertion of the necessity defense by Argentina as
an excuse for taking actions that were wrong. The CMS Tribunal refuses
therefore to preclude wrongfulness despite Argentina's "excuse."
Alternatively, the LG&E Tribunal treats the defense as a justification.
The panel absolved Argentina of liability and damages for the period of
crisis, justifying the Governments actions in light of the social, economic
and political circumstances alleged. Thus, the decision in LG&E pre-
cludes Argentina from wrongfulness. As such, it would appear that the
LG&E reasoning may actually be closer to the intent of the drafters of
the Draft Articles, yet nothing in the commentary would suggest that this
is so.
122. Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The Growing Opposition of Argentina to
ICSID Arbitral Tribunals: A Conflict Between International and Domestic Law?, 6
J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 417, PINCITE (2005).
123. See Johnstone, supra note 38, at 378.
124. Id. at 350.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford Univ.
Press 1978)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 352-353.
129. CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2005 WL 1201002 322.
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Perhaps the two approaches of the Tribunals to the problem explain
the different results, CMS disallows the excuse and LG&E allows the
justification. But, the doctrine of necessity may in fact be neither. Cor-
porations can invoke the protections of bankruptcy when in financial cri-
sis, freezing whatever assets are left for reorganization or dissolution, and
in most cases, many creditors are left with nothing despite contracts with
all types of language to the contrary. Perhaps necessity, when applied
correctly in the narrowest of circumstances, is neither a justification nor
an excuse, but rather a remedy that acknowledges that a wrong occurred
but holds that suspension of obligation is the only means available post-
crisis to provide some creditors with some compensation and give the
host country a "fresh start." When circumstance leads to injustice for all,
the only way to proceed is to restore as much to as many as possible.
VII. SUGGESTED DAMAGES ANALYSIS
FOR THE LG&E RESULT
The LG&E Tribunal rendered its decision on liability on October 3,
2006, but has yet to conclude on damages. Article 27 of the Draft Arti-
cles provides that even if a party prevails on a defense precluding wrong-
fulness (such as the necessity defense) it does so without prejudice to the
question of compensation. 130 But the Tribunal in its findings declared
that all measures adopted by Argentina both before and after the period
of exemption "shall be taken into account by the Tribunal to estimate the
damages." 131
In a disturbingly unprecedented move, however, the Tribunal then spe-
cifically assigned all damages for the duration of the crisis to LG&E, pre-
cluding them from subsequently recovering for those losses. 132 The only
reason given was that the investors assumed the risk of foreign invest-
ment. 133 The Tribunal did not legally support such an absolution of the
Argentinean government but simply noted the lack of instruction in the
Draft Articles and the BIT as to who should compensate for losses in-
curred during a state of necessity.' 34
130. Draft Articles, supra note 16, art. 27.
Article 27: The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in
accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to: (a) Compliance with
the obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance pre-
cluding wrongfulness no longer exists; (b) The question of compensation
for any material loss caused by the act in question.
131. LG&E, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2006 WL 2985837 263.
132. Id. 1[ 264.
133. Id. 107, 260-61, 264.
134. Id. 260-264 (emphasis in original).
The commentary introduced by the Special Rapporteur establishes that
article 27 "does not attempt to specify in what circumstances compensa-
tion would be payable." The rule does not specify if compensation is
payable during the state of necessity or whether the State should reas-
sume its obligations . . . [T]his Tribunal has decided that the damages
suffered during the state of necessity
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This wholesale assignment to LG&E was despite the Tribunal's earlier
analysis of the fair and equitable treatment clause of the BIT where the
Tribunal found that the Government of Argentina went "too far by com-
pletely dismantling the very legal framework constructed to attract inves-
tors.' 35 This ruling introduces the investment-chilling idea that the
investor bears the entirety of the risk whenever it cannot establish that
the defaulting country was not protecting an essential security interest,
even when the Government is admittedly not totally free from all blame.
It is evident from the facts of the case and the conclusions of the IMF
that Argentina was facing an enormous social, economic and political cri-
sis with very limited choices. Widespread violent demonstrations and
protests halted the economy and shut down the transportation systems.136
But LG&E claims between $248 million and $268 million in total lost
profits. 137 Certainly the toll for the seventeen-month crisis window was
in the hundreds of millions. Although Argentina has been found liable
for the portion of LG&E's claim that accrued beyond the defined crisis
period and will likely pay a large sum, assigning wholesale the costs of the
crisis itself to the investor is a troubling proposition. This not only pro-
vides a disincentive for foreign companies to invest in new or emerging
democracies, but also discourages countries in crisis from emerging from
peril; the longer a country is found to be "in crisis" the fewer damages it
must pay to those injured.
Although a state may be justified in taking emergency measures in
times of economic, social and political crisis, the investor should not have
to walk away from the situation empty-handed, especially in considera-
tion of almost a year and a half of lost profits. The necessity defense itself
embodies a balancing of interests, prohibiting a state from invoking the
defense if its actions "seriously impair an essential interest of the State or
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international commu-
nity as a whole. ' 138 This theme of balancing interests is also found in
Draft Article 33, which defines the scope of international obligations. 139
Therefore, a fairer proposal seems to be a "balancing test" or "neces-
sity discount" approach that entails a weighing of the social, political, and
economic interests of Argentina and the risks assumed by the investor
against LG&E's lost profits in crisis, then calculating the total amount of
the damages for which Argentina would have been responsible in the ab-
sence of crisis and discounting them for the urgency of the necessity mea-
sures involved. Admittedly, this is a circumstantial and speculative
135. Id. T 139.
136. Id. T 235.
137. Id. T 74.
138. Draft Articles, supra note 16, art. 25.
139. "This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsi-
bility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a
State." Id. art. 33(2). See also Boed, supra note 39, for a more extensive discussion
of "balancing test" notions in the humanitarian application of the necessity
defense.
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approach that requires the adjudicating body to determine the "direness"
of the necessity, but it eliminates the incentive to a country to prolong the
appearance of crisis and provides it with a reasonable measure of exemp-
tion for the period of crisis, all while preserving the vital BIT protections
expected by the investor.
VIII. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Both tribunals, though reaching different conclusions, agreed on a few
key issues. First, they both acknowledged the doctrine of necessity as a
defense that may preclude wrongdoing. This basic agreement on the exis-
tence and legitimacy of "economic necessity" as a defense is more signifi-
cant than it seems at first glance. Modern arbitrators have called the very
existence of the "necessity defense" into question as recently as 1990 in
the Rainbow Warrior case. There is no shortage of legal debate regarding
the establishment of the doctrine in customary international law. The
fact that the ICSID Tribunals accepted the necessity defense in accor-
dance with the Draft Articles lends great support to the argument that
necessity is not limited solely to military action.
Additionally, both of the Tribunals agreed that Article 11 of the Treaty
is not self-executing. This is important because it allows a country to take
whatever measures are necessary to avoid a crisis but removes the judg-
ment as to whether the crisis is indeed an "essential security interest" to a
third and presumably neutral party. Finally, although they used the Draft
Articles in different ends of the analysis, both panels recognized the au-
thority of the definition of "necessity" in Article 25 and the accompany-
ing commentary.
The drafters of the Treaty must have been savvy enough to understand
that risk is inherent in investment and that developing countries are risky
environments. However, it is doubtful that they contemplated a seven-
teen-month exposure for investors due to civil, political, and economic
unrest. Since it is clear that "essential security interest" will be read to
include economic crises, perhaps BITs should include "necessity clauses"
that set forth exactly what types of instabilities in the public or financial
order will trigger a situation of necessity so as to justify a breach of the
BIT. This would certainly refine the investors' expectations and would
further guide the governments of the host countries as they formulate
economic policy.
Perhaps it is true, as William Pitt, Secretary of State in Great Britain
during the Seven Years' War, stated, "Necessity is the plea of every in-
fringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the
creed of slaves." Or is it true that in extraordinarily narrow and unique
circumstances, the availability of the defense of necessity "must be so" as
noted by Lord Ashburton? Only further application and development of
the doctrine as either a justification or an excuse will provide the answer.
Until then, necessity provides an avenue by which a state may take criti-
cal action to defend fundamental interests, but the weight of customary
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law to date is against preclusion of wrongfulness through its use. Accord-
ingly, the narrow language of the Draft Articles and the limited develop-
ment of the economic necessity defense in international courts and
tribunals caution against a full embrace of the LG&E decision.
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